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Abstract The paper concerns the problem of the legal responsibility of autonomous
machines. In our opinion it boils down to the question of whether such machines can
be seen as real agents through the prism of folk-psychology. We argue that
autonomous machines cannot be granted the status of legal agents. Although this is
quite possible from purely technical point of view, since the law is a conventional
tool of regulating social interactions and as such can accommodate various leg-
islative constructs, including legal responsibility of autonomous artificial agents, we
believe that it would remain a mere ‘law in books’, never materializing as ‘law in
action’. It is not impossible to imagine that the evolution of our conceptual appa-
ratus will reach a stage, when autonomous robots become full-blooded moral and
legal agents. However, today at least, we seem to be far from this point.
Keywords Autonomous agents  Responsibility  Folk-psychology 
Law in action
1 Introduction
Our goal in this paper is to consider the question whether autonomous machines can
be legal agents, i.e. whether they can be legally responsible for their actions. By an
autonomous machine we understand ‘‘a system situated within and a part of an
environment that senses that environment and acts on it, over time, in pursuit of its
own agenda and so as to effect what it senses in the future’’ (Franklin and Graesser
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1997). According to this definition, an autonomous machine is reactive (it responds
in a timely fashion to changes in the environment), self-controlling (i.e. it exercises
control over its own actions and is not directly controlled by any other agent), goal-
oriented (it does not simply act in response to the environment), and temporally
continuous (it is a continuously running process) (Franklin and Graesser 1997). Of
course, autonomous machines may have additional properties such as the ability to
communicate with other agents or change their behaviour in line with previous
experience; they may even be equipped with ‘‘believable personality’’, i.e. act in
such a way which gives an impression of the possession of individual ‘‘character
traits’’ (Franklin and Graesser 1997). The definition provided above is therefore to
serve as a kind of conceptual threshold: the conclusions we reach shall be applicable
to any autonomous machine, i.e. a reactive, self-controlling, goal-oriented and
temporally continuous artificial agent, whether it has other (stronger) properties or
not.
We begin, in Sect. 2, by considering two extreme views in relation to this
problem, which we deem ‘restrictivism’ and ‘permissivism’. The former denies the
possibility of holding autonomous machines legally responsible on purely
metaphysical grounds; the latter imposes no restrictions on the possible legal
constructions, and hence does not prohibit the introduction of the responsibility of
artificial autonomous agents. We argue that both these stances are mistaken. Next,
in Sect. 3, we try to show that in order to properly consider our question one needs
to analyse the relationship between three different conceptualisations of human
behaviour: folk-psychological, scientific (provided by psychology, neurobiology,
etc.), and legal. We claim that the law—in order to be an efficient tool for regulating
social interactions—must be largely based on the conceptual scheme of folk-
psychology. Finally, in Sect. 4, we argue for two claims: that the problem of legal
responsibility of autonomous machines is completely different from the question of
the responsibility of legal persons such as corporations, foundations, or states; and
that the conceptual apparatus of folk-psychology makes it impossible to treat
machines as legal agents.
2 Between two extremes
There are two extreme views regarding the legal responsibility of autonomous
artificial agents. The first one may be deemed restrictive and boils down to the claim
that machines—no matter how ‘‘intelligent’’ or ‘‘autonomous’’—can never become
legal persons and be legally responsible for their actions. The usual argument
adduced to substantiate this claim highlights certain properties of the human
being—such as intentionality, free will, autonomy or consciousness—which seem to
constitute the prerequisites of legal (and moral) responsibility (e.g. Fischer and
Ravizza 2000), but which are apparently lacking in any machine. On the other end
of the spectrum is permissivism, the claim that the law is a flexible tool of social
engineering, which may be used to make anyone—or anything—a legal person (i.e.
a legal agent and/or patient). From this point of view, there is no real problem in
holding an autonomous artificial agent responsible for their actions; the same holds
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for any other object, be it a stone, a river or a comet. History of law shows clearly
that it is possible: legal systems often excluded some human beings from the pool of
legal agents or patients (slaves, children, etc.) or included in the pool the entities
which lacked the characteristic features of ‘‘full-blooded’’ actors (e.g., Whanganui
river in New Zeland) (Hutchison 2014).
Of course, neither of the two extremes is easy to accept. The restrictive view is
firmly based on very strong metaphysical claims, and there are reasons to deem
them doubtful. A particularly clear and persuasive rejection of restrictivism can be
found in Hage 2017. Hage observes that we usually think of legal responsibility as
requiring two things: intentionality and free will. This is the bedrock of our every-
day experience of legal (and moral) action. However—argues Hage—this is a
‘‘realist mistake’’. We have a tendency to treat intention to act and the will that leads
to the performance of an act as ‘‘real things’’, ‘‘out there’’ in the world, independent
of the human mind. Meanwhile, Hage claims that there are no grounds for
embracing the realist standpoint. Rather, intention and free will should be
understood as things we attribute to one another. The complex network of social
interactions is based on such attributions: irrespective of the real nature of human
action, we grasp it by deploying a conceptual apparatus which utilises the concepts
of intention, free will, autonomy, etc. This shows, Hage argues, that the restrictive
conception of the responsibility of artificial agents rests on a grave mistake. If
intention and free will are not ‘‘real’’ phenomena, but are mere outcomes of our
attributions, they cannot constitute necessary conditions of legal (or moral)
responsibility. It follows that there is nothing barring the ascription of responsibility
to machines (Hage 2017).
To put it in a different way: the fatal flaw of restrictivism is the fact that it is
based on very strong and apparently mistaken ontological assumptions. Attribu-
tivism is much more plausible: it not only embraces weaker ontological
commitments, but also seems to be more coherent with the actual social practice.
People have the default tendency to understand the actions of others in terms of
intentions and free will, and to do so they apply no special tests determining whether
an agent X has ‘‘real’’ intentions or acts out of free will (see O’Connor 2010,
Nahmias et al. 2005). Rather, these things are assumed and such assumptions are
upheld as long as there is no evidence to the contrary (e.g., that someone has
concealed their intentions, was coerced, etc.). But does it mean that by rejecting the
restrictive view we are forced to embrace the permissive one? Is the decision to
make artificial agents legally responsible for their actions purely conventional? Is
the concept of legal responsibility so flexible that anything may be regarded as a
legal agent?
A natural answer to this question is that while there are no conceptual limits to
ascribing legal agency, there must be special reasons to do so in relation to anyone
or anything which is not a human being. The concept of legal responsibility is
flexible, but it cannot be used indiscriminately. This is the line of reasoning
employed by Hage when he argues that the attribution of legal responsibility to
artificial agents would be justified only if its consequences (such as influencing
future behaviour of the agent to whom responsibility is attributed or influencing
future behaviour of other agents) were desirable (Hage 2017).
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In a similar spirit (Bryson et al. 2017) argue that since legal personhood is a
fiction, ‘‘the inherent characteristics of a thing are not determinative of whether the
[legal] system treats it as a legal person (Bryson et al. 2017)’’. It follows that—
conceptually—artificial agents can be treated as legal persons (agents and/or
patients). However, granting machines a legal status may lead to abuse. The danger
is not merely imagined, given our experience with legal persons such as
corporations or international organisations. ‘‘Trying to hold an electronic person
to account, claimants would experience all the problems that have arisen in the past
with novel legal persons. There almost inevitably would arise asymmetries in
particular legal systems, situations like that of the investor under investment treaties
who can hold a respondent party to account but under the same treaties is not itself
accountable (Bryson et al. 2017)’’.
Let us repeat that the constraints on ascribing legal agency to machines as
suggested by Hage and Bryson et al. are not of fundamental nature. Neither Hage
nor Bryson et al. seem to believe that there are conceptual barriers to extend the
pool of legal agents so as to include autonomous artificial agents. Rather, they claim
that it may turn out to be a bad decision in terms of its consequences, e.g. when it
will not lead to the socially desired outcomes or even to legal abuse. In other words,
they temper permissivism (the idea that legal personhood may be granted to
anything, including machines) only by employing utilitarian criteria, which are
external to the problem of whether machines can in principle be legally responsible
for their actions.We believe that the situation is more complex.
3 Three conceptual schemes
The distinction between law in books and law in action was introduced by Pound
(1910), and popularised in the writings of American legal realists. Painting with a
broad brush, law in books is the collection of legal acts, court rulings and other law-
related documents, while law in action is the set of norms of conduct actually
enforced in the court of law. Horwitz (1992) has called this distinction the
‘‘realists’s battle cry’’, and although it falls short of serving as the realists’ definition
of law, it nevertheless underpins the importance of the practical dimension of legal
phenomena. No sophisticated theoretical construction embodied in a legal act can
count as law as long as it is not observed and enforced in legal practice. This claim
is also not completely alien to legal positivists: even Hans Kelsen, who considered
the legal system as an ideal belonging to the sphere of pure ‘‘ought’’, understood
that there is no binding law if the legal system is not—by and large—efficacious
(Kelsen 1945).
Applied to our problem, the distinction between law in books and law in action
yields the following question: it seems possible—according to the position
advocated by permissivists—to grant legal status to any object, including intelligent
machines. The legislator is free to introduce any legal construction that may serve
their goals. However, there is a danger that the construction in question would
remain ‘‘in books’’ only, having no real significance for the legal practice. Arguably,
there are several conditions for a successful implementation of ‘‘law in books’’ in
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legal practise: some of them pertain to the realisation of the goals of the regulation
(there exists a need to realise the given goal, the legal means of realising it are
properly selected), others to the form of the regulation (e.g. Summers 2006). In
particular, any law must be understandable to its addressees. It is difficult to imagine
‘‘law in action’’ based on highly complicated provisions, which are extremely
difficult to comprehend (a case in point is tax law, which often is difficult to follow
and requires the assistance of specialised tax advisors).
In the context of the question pertaining to the ascription of responsibility to
autonomous artificial agents, it is necessary to consider the relationship between
three different conceptual schemes, which are all related to human behaviour: folk-
psychological, scientific, and legal. Let us begin by considering the first two. Folk
psychology is usually understood as the ability of mind-reading, i.e. of ascribing
mental states to other people (Stich 1983). A more detailed characterisation—albeit
not an incontestable one—has it that folk psychology is a set of the fundamental
capacities which enable us to describe our behaviour and the behaviour of others, to
explain the behaviour of others, to predict and anticipate their behaviour, and to
produce generalisations pertaining to human behaviour (Stich and Ravenscroft
1992). Those abilities manifest themselves in what may be called the phenomeno-
logical level of folk psychology as ‘‘a rich conceptual repertoire which [normal
human adults] deploy to explain, predict and describe the actions of one another
and, perhaps, members of closely related species also. (…) The conceptual
repertoire constituting folk psychology includes, predominantly, the concepts of
belief and desire and their kin—intention, hope, fear, and the rest—the so-called
propositional attitudes’’ (Davies and Stone 1995). It is the conceptual apparatus that
we deploy every day to understand and predict the behaviour of other people.
Interestingly, folk psychology is to a large extent culture-dependent: people
belonging to various cultures conceptualise human action in essentially different
ways. For example, according to a much discussed study by Michael Morris and
Kaiping Peng, Asians tend to explain behaviour by citing situational factors,
whereas Westerners explain it by focusing on personal causes such as beliefs and
desires (Morris and Peng 1994). The study in question concerned, inter alia, the
explanation of a mass murder. In The World Journal the Chinese reporters focused
on the situational causes influencing the behaviour of the mass murderer, and
mentioned that the ‘‘gunman had been recently fired,’’ ‘‘the post office supervisor
was his enemy,’’ and that he ‘‘followed the example of a recent mass slaying in
Texas’’. On the other hand, in The New York Times the American reporters focused
on the dispositions of the mass murderer, noticing that he ‘‘repeatedly threatened
violence,’’ ‘‘had a short fuse,’’ ‘‘was a martial arts enthusiast,’’ and was ‘‘mentally
unstable’’.
The scientific explanation of human behaviour, and the conceptual scheme it
utilises, is quite different from folk psychology. Let us have a look at an example
pertaining to moral judgment and action. One of the more famous recent attempts to
explain the mechanisms behind the human ability to reason morally is Jonathan
Haidt’s social intuitionist model. In his essay ‘‘The Emotional Dog And Its Rational
Tail’’ (2001), Haidt argues that one should reject the rationalistic paradigm in moral
psychology, i.e. an approach ‘‘that moral knowledge and moral judgement are
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reached primarily by a process of reasoning and reflection’’ (Haidt 2001). Instead,
he claims that moral judgement always appears in consciousness in an automatic,
effortless way, as a result of the workings of moral intuition. Moral reasoning, on
the other hand, is a process tied up with effort and takes place usually after the
decision has been reached, supporting it only ex post (Haidt 2001). It should also be
added that on Haidt’s view moral intuition is formed in the course of social
interactions, and its development is tied up with a number of processes. In this
context, a special role is played by the unconscious mechanism of cultural
transmission. Numerous experiments and observations suggest that only a relatively
small part of our cultural knowledge is learned consciously—children acquire it
mainly through the imitation of the behaviour of older children and adults (e.g.
Meltzoff and Decety 2003; Want and Harris 2002). Haidt points out that the recent
findings regarding the neural foundations of intuition underscore the importance of
practice and repetition for the proper training of cultural intuitions. He claims
further that the process of social learning depends on the activity of the basal
ganglia’s circuits, which are also instrumental to motor learning: because of that
many social skills are rapid and automatic, just like well-learned motor sequences
are. Social skills and judgement processes, learned in a gradual and implicit way,
are experienced in the consciousness as arising from nowhere. ‘‘The implication of
these findings for moral psychology is that moral intuitions are developed and
shaped as children behave, imitate, and otherwise take part in the practices and
custom complexes of their culture. (…) Even though people in all cultures have
more or less the same bodies, they have different embodiments, and therefore end
up with different minds’’ (Haidt 2001).
Let us now come back to the already cited example of the explanation of a mass
murder in Asian and Western cultures. While in both cases the crime was judged
morally outrageous, the Asian folk-psychological way of seeing things was through
a number of situational factors influencing the actions of the mass-murderer; the
reporters of The New York Times, on the other hand, while describing a similar
tragedy, concentrated on the subjective aspects of the situation, such as mental
instability of the perpetrator or his enthusiasm for martial arts. In other words, the
moral condemnation of the incident is accompanied in both cultures by different
explanations of the murderer’s behaviour. While Asians tend to see human action as
largely a product of circumstances, the Americans take a more individualistic
approach to explaining it. From the point of view of Haidt’s theory, the
condemnation of mass murder can be explained in the following way. First, the
act brings about an intuitive moral judgement. This intuition is not inborn—it is
trained in the process of enculturation. Second, the intuition may be followed by an
ex post, rationalised justification. Crucially, Haidt’s theory does not determine
which aspects of the perpetrator’s behaviour should be taken into account in moral
judgement: it puts emphasis neither on external circumstances (as the Asian folk
psychology does), nor on individual agency (as is the case in the American culture).
At the same time, Haidt’s model can easily account for such cultural differences.
Let us recall that moral judgement is not something one is born with; rather, a
number of emotional mechanisms and cognitive skills are shaped by a particular
culture to generate both moral intuition and the public criteria for moral
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justification. In other words, what the Asians and the Americans have in common
are some fundamental emotional and cognitive capacities, which are ‘‘filled in’’ with
the moral content characteristic of a given culture.
The mechanism described by Haidt captures a part of what may be called the
architectural level of folk psychology. It explains how people—through their
upbringing in a given culture—acquire the ability to apply a conceptual apparatus
for explaining, predicting and describing the moral actions of themselves and other
people, i.e. how the phenomenological level of folk psychology emerges. From this
perspective, the scientific explanation of the human moral behaviour—as proposed
by Haidt—is ‘‘deeper’’ than the folk-psychological: the former provides an account
of the latter. However, the ‘‘deep’’ architectural level is not directly accessible to a
person who makes a moral decision or attempts to explain or describe the behaviour
of other people. In everyday situations, when we try to understand the actions of
others or held them responsible for what they do, we have no other option but rely
on the conceptual repertoire of folk psychology, which includes such concepts as
intention, goal, belief and free will. Thus, even though our judgments and actions
may in most instances be the outcomes of unconscious processes, we conceptualise
them as free and intentional.
Finally, let us consider the legal conceptual scheme. It is easy to notice that it is
largely based on the folk-psychological concepts. For example, in relation to crimes
we speak of mens rea (guilty mind), intention, committing a crime knowingly,
maliciously or willingly, with specific intent, etc. (Greene and Cohen 2004). It is
difficult—if not impossible—to imagine social life without these concepts. Jerry
Fodor goes as far as saying that the elimination of the conceptual repertoire of folk
psychology would be ‘‘the greatest intellectual catastrophe in the history of our
species’’ (Fodor 1987, xii). In order to get a better understanding of what the
rejection of the folk-psychological concepts for explaining action would look like,
let us consider the following thought experiment. In a country X, the parliamentary
election is won by SPEM, the Solemn Party of Eliminative Materialism. The main
goal of SPEM—deeply rooted in the philosophical doctrines of Patricia and Paul
Churchland (Churchland 1981)—is to get rid of all the cultural constructions which
assume the existence of immaterial reality. In other words, to use a term coined by
Daniel Dennett in his Philosophical Lexicon, the program of SPEM is to change the
country X into Churchland, i.e. ‘‘a theocracy whose official religion is eliminative
materialism’’ (Dennett 2008). Having finally won the majority in the parliament,
SPEM replaces all the legal provisions which utilise folk-psychological concepts
pertaining to ‘‘immaterial phenomena’’, such as intention or will, with the
description of the relevant physical (materialistic) processes. Thus, for example,
the rule which says that ‘‘A person commits a criminal offence if he or she acts with
intention, recklessness, or negligence’’ is replaced with ‘‘A person commits a
criminal offence if he or she has an elevated blood pressure in prefrontal cortex,
motor cortex, basal ganglia and cerebellum’’, while the rule ‘‘A person who acts in
self-defence is not criminally liable’’ becomes ‘‘A person whose oxytocin level is
elevated is not criminally liable’’. It is not difficult to observe that such radical
changes to the conceptual foundations of the legal system would result in complete
chaos. The new law would be totally incomprehensible, even if the science behind it
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was flawless and identified the real mechanisms responsible for human action. There
is no escape from the folk-psychological conceptual scheme: any legal system must
be based on it, otherwise it would become an incomprehensible, futile exercise in
theory-construction. A law taking advantage of the conceptual apparatus of
eliminative materialism would remain law in books, never becoming law in action.
4 The legal responsibility of autonomous artificial agents
So far we have argued that (1) neither extreme restrictivism nor extreme
permissivism are a viable choice when it comes to deciding whether autonomous
machines may be legally responsible—the construction of legal responsibility must
lie in-between those two extreme options; and that (2) the concept of legal
responsibility is deeply rooted in the folk-psychological understanding of human
action—the legislator cannot disregard the fact that people conceptualise their own
behaviour as well as the behaviour of others in terms of intentions, goals, beliefs,
etc. In other words, we have tried to show that although legal responsibility is not
founded on solid metaphysical grounds (the real existence of free will, intentions,
etc.), there are conceptual limitations which prevent the legislator from departing
too far from the folk-psychological understanding of what responsibility consists in.
The addressees of the law would simply fail to understand a view of legal
responsibility which is essentially different from how the folk-psychological
conceptual scheme structures human action.
Let us now come back to the question whether—and if so, under what
conditions—autonomous artificial agents may be held legally responsible for their
actions. Arguably, the fact that ‘‘genuine’’ legal responsibility is a theoretical
reconceptualisation of the relevant aspects of folk psychology, may have no bearing
on the question of the legal status of autonomous machines. After all, legal systems
make room for civil and criminal liability of legal persons, such as corporations,
foundations, states or municipalities (Wells 2001; Leigh 1982). It would be difficult
to argue that a corporation or a state has (or is ascribed) ‘‘free will’’ or ‘‘intention’’
or may act ‘‘wilfully’’ or ‘‘knowingly’’. Nevertheless, we find it possible to hold
them legally responsible for certain actions. Similarly, it may not be necessary to
ascribe intentions or free will to an autonomous machine in order to deem it
responsible for what it does.
We believe that there is an important problem with this argument: the analogy
between legal persons and autonomous machines is far from perfect. The reasons for
holding corporations and similar legal entities responsible for certain events are
quite straightforward. First, in some cases, it may be difficult to identify an
individual, whose actions caused the damage (e.g., that a patient at a hospital got
infected with some disease), while it is obvious that it happened in relation to the
operations of a legal person (e.g., a hospital). Second, legal persons usually have
much deeper pockets than individuals, and hence it is reasonable to ask the
restitution from them rather than sue an individual. However, let us observe that the
actions of a legal person are always traceable back to the actions of an individual
person or a group of persons, even if it is not possible to clearly identify them. In
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other words, legal responsibility of corporations and similar entities is connected to
acts performed by their representatives or employees. From this perspective,
holding legal persons legally responsible does not go against the folk-psychological
understanding of agency; rather, it is a kind of ‘‘prosthesis’’ the legal system utilises
to ensure a more efficient and swift restitution of justice. Moreover, on closer
inspection things are more complicated than they appear on the surface. A case in
point is criminal responsibility of legal persons. In some jurisdictions (e.g., in
Germany), a legal person cannot be subjected to criminal proceedings; in other legal
systems (e.g., in France or in Poland), criminal responsibility of legal entities is
possible, but only under the condition that an individual physical person, who
committed the act ‘‘on behalf’’ of the legal person, is identified. This clearly shows
that the idea of the legal responsibility of legal persons is not a natural extension of
the folk-psychological view of human agency: even if we allow legal persons to be
charged with criminal offences, much is done to link it to the actions of individual
human beings (Khanna 1996).
Given those considerations, it is safe to say that legal responsibility of an
autonomous machine would be quite different from the legal responsibility of a
legal person. Although the pragmatic justification would be quite similar (e.g., to
ensure a swift and efficient administration of justice), the actions of an autonomous
artificial agent (as we understand the term in this paper) would not be directly
traceable back to the actions of a human agent. Thus, we believe that the fact that
there exists legal responsibility of legal persons has no relevance what so ever for
the question of the accountability of autonomous machines. Behind the legal person
there always is some human being. An autonomous artificial agent, on the other
hand, would need to be regarded as a real actor in the web of social interaction, not a
mere legal facade, which facilitates the pursuit of justice or offers more efficient
means of redress.
Therefore, we believe that the problem pertaining to the legal responsibility of
autonomous machines boils down to the question of whether such machines can be
seen as genuine agents through the prism of folk psychology. Let us consider the
following thought experiment. We meet a new person, Mr. Y. He is an intelligent
and likeable man, easy to get along with. He is also ready to help, when the need
arises, excels in conversation and enjoys spending time with his new friends. He
acts with dignity in difficult situations, and whenever he is mistreated by his
hotheaded employer, we feel sympathy for him. However, one day we learn that he
is a sophisticated android, equipped with state-of-the-art autonomous algorithms,
enabling him to navigate the troubled seas of social interactions. The algorithms are
so perfect that they calculate the adequate reaction to any social encounter, are able
to recognise complex patterns of facial expression in any interlocutor, estimate the
intensity of the emotions expressed by others, and mimic the behaviour of someone
who is in pain, feels sorrow, is happy or troubled. The algorithms are so cleverly
designed that Mr. Y, who in some tasks - such as playing chess or doing complex
calculations - is orders of magnitude better than we are, never displays those
abilities when interacting with us. The question is, whether we change our attitude
towards Mr. Y? We believe that most of us would treat him differently. Before
discovering his real nature, i.e. the fact that Mr. Y is a purely deterministic device,
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we would have treated him as any other human being, attributing him beliefs,
intentions, emotions, and free will. After realising that Mr. Y is an android, we
would probably change our attitude. After all, Mr. Y does not really feel physical or
emotional pain, so why be sympathetic when his boss treats him badly? When
helping us, he had sacrificed nothing—he just acted as his algorithms dictated—so
why should we be grateful? He is not a moral or a legal agent, but a sophisticated
machine, which resembles a car or an iPhone much more than it resembles a human
being. His actions are dictated neither by sentiments towards us nor by reason, and
so he is as blameworthy for his deeds as a falling stone, which accidentally injures a
passerby.
Of course, this claim may be contested. For instance, one may observe that
people often have a tendency to ascribe intentions to inanimate objects. Ever since
the famous experiments of Heider and Simmel (1944), it has been well known that
we are able to spontaneously conceptualise the observed movement of even simple
geometrical figures such as circles and rectangles as an intentional action. This
tendency may be well rooted in our evolutionary past: it has been speculated that
from birth humans have the ability to perceive things in two diametrically different
ways, as governed either by causality or intentionality (Bloom 2004). However,
such a ‘‘default’’ conceptualisation of some phenomena as intentional surely has its
limits. On the one hand, it is unlikely that one would be willing to ascribe agency or
intentionality to circles and rectangles beyond the confines of an relatively isolated
event. To put it differently, it is unlikely that one would ascribe intentions, goals and
beliefs to inanimate objects in any systematic way. On the other hand, research in
developmental psychology suggests that even if small children are eager to see
robots as animate and intelligent agents, the older they become the less animistic are
their intuitions regarding machines (Okita and Schwartz 2006). This can be
interpreted as evidence that the gradual shaping of folk-psychology in the process of
inculturation leads to the exclusion of robots from the pool of intentional agents.
These observations seem to reinforce our intuition that once the discovery is made
that Mr Y is an android, he would no longer be treated as a moral agent by most
people.
If we are right, then the same applies to all kinds of autonomous machines, which
resemble human beings even less than Mr Y. From this perspective, it is hard to
imagine the communal understanding and acceptance of granting autonomous
machines the status of legal agents. Of course, this conclusion in an essential way
depends on our current folk-psychological conceptual scheme. After all, in our past
we have treated animals and even inanimate objects such as rivers or volcanoes as
actors in the web of social interactions. It is not impossible to imagine that the
evolution of our conceptual apparatus will reach a stage, when autonomous robots
become full-blooded moral and legal agents. However, today at least, we seem to be
far from this point.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have argued that autonomous machines cannot be granted the
status of legal agents. Although this is quite possible from purely technical point of
view, since the law is a conventional tool of regulating social interactions and as
such can accommodate various legislative constructs, including legal responsibility
of autonomous artificial agents, we believe that it would remain a mere ‘‘law in
books’’, never materialising as ‘‘law in action’’. The reason is that the law, and in
particular such a fundamental institution as legal responsibility, must be compre-
hensible for the people who are subject to legal rights and obligations. Meanwhile,
as we have argued, our perception of human action and responsibility—i.e. our folk
psychology—is not suited to see autonomous machines as the authors of their
actions. This may change with the evolution of our conceptualisations of agency,
but such changes require much time.
It should be added that our position does not favour any concrete view of moral or
legal agency. In particular, it does not lead to accepting a kind of utilitarianism, which
posits, inter alia, that autonomous machines cannot be moral (or legal) agents, since
they cannot suffer from any punishment—they feel neither pain nor pleasure (Sparrow
2007). We do believe that the ability to experience emotions is a part of the folk-
psychological understanding of personhood and agency. However, the ability in
question is not the sole foundation for ascribing moral or legal responsibility: it is
important, insomuch as it constitutes an aspect of the folk-psychological conceptu-
alisation of agency. In other words, when referred to by the followers of Bentham, the
capacity to feel pain and pleasure becomes a normative criterion for ascribing moral
(or legal) responsibility; similarly, whenKantians speak of an autonomous application
of reason (i.e. not influenced by factors external to reason itself, e.g. emotions) tomoral
and legal questions, they are formulating a normative criterion ofmoral (legal) agency:
an agent incapable of such autonomous reasoning cannot be subject to moral (legal)
rights and duties. Our claim is not normative, it is rather descriptive and conceptual:
the ascription of moral and legal responsibility is always mediated through the folk-
psychological understanding of agency.
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